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Abstract. Although the ultimate bodhicitta functions within a non-dual model of 
cognition where oppositions (good and evil, pure and impure, saṃsāra–nirvāṇa, etc.) 
do not exist, it is traditionally considered to be the wisdom cognising emptiness. In this 
paper I will try to explore the cognitive nature of the ultimate bodhicitta to answer the 
question ‘What kind of cognition is the cognising of emptiness?’ In the paper I also 
will make an attempt to describe the basics of ambivalent Tantric ethics in terms of the 
phenomenological category of imitation or mimesis.
Verses on the ultimate bodhicitta in the second chapter of the Guhyasamājatantra 
are a subject of commentaries written by various Tibetan and Indian authors. The paper 
is supplemented with a translation of Bodhicittabhāvanā written by Ācārya Kamalaśīla. 
This short text is a commentary on verses proclaimed by Tathagāgata Vairocana in the 
second chapter of Guhyasamājatantra.
The strategy of cognition presented in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma is pointed at the 
deconstruction of gnosiological determinants (avidyā, prapañca) that are responsible 
for the persistent generation of the defective and suffering world of living beings. 
Total cessation of these gnosiological determinants results in nirupadhiśeṣa 
nirvāṇa—nirvāṇa without residual formations of mind and body—and leads to an 
unconditional world that stands apart from the customary environment that is open 
to our mutual experience. The existence of two opposite states of being (saṃsāra–
nirvāṇa) requires a transition associated with a system of moral renunciations and 
epistemological declinations.
In Prajñāpāramitā literature and later in works of Nāgārjuna, the ‘transitional 
model’ is overlaid by another, non-dualistic disposition of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa 
attended by a different paradoxical strategy of cognition. 
In Bodhicittavivaraṇa, verse 21, Nāgārjuna says:
It’s the sameness of the object that functions, [if asserted],
Is this not like being harmed in a dream?
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These notes are only an attempt to outline several, I hope important, topics that require ad-
ditional investigation. I also would like to thank Prof. Deborah Sommer (Gettysburg College) who 
made this paper readable by thorough proofreading.
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Between the dream and wakeful state there is no difference
Insofar as the functioning of things is concerned.1
Also in Yuktiṣaṣṭikā we read: 
Existence and nirvāṇa: These two are not [really] to be found. [Instead,] nirvāṇa [may be] 
defined as the thorough knowledge of existence. (Lindtner 1986, 74–5)
The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrika-prajñāpāramitā states:
Coursing in the baseless, he [Bodhisattva—V.K.] sees all dharmas as contained in this 
perfection of wisdom, and yet he does not apprehend those dharmas. And why? Because 
these dharmas on the one hand and that perfection of wisdom on the other are not two 
nor divided. And why? Because there is no differentiation between these dharmas. All 
dharmas are undifferentiated because they have been identified with the dharma-element 
(dharmadhātu), with suchness (tathatā), with reality limit (bhūtakoṭi). (Conze 1979, 628)
Though these approaches seem different, they both are ‘based on the general 
Buddhist notion that the actual soteriological breakthrough comes in the form of an 
intellectual event, gnosis, and not an emotional one’ (Wangchuk 2007, 199). In each 
intellectual event, consciousness (vijñāna) is indispensably involved, but consciousness 
arises dependent on avidyā, influenced by prapañca and vikalpa, and it is constantly 
changing. It must be stopped, radically transformed, or replaced by some other 
instrument of cognition to ensure the vision of things as they really are (vidyā).
In Tantric Buddhism the disposition of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is similar to the 
disposition given in the Pāramitāyana, but instead of the analysis of the true nature of 
phenomena as an instrument of cognition, Tantric Buddhism offers specific cognition 
techniques and specific understandings of ethical prescriptions. In the second chapter 
of the Guhyasamājatantra, this alternative instrument of cognition is introduced as ‘the 
secret of all Tathagāgatas, highest bodhicitta (de bzhin gshegs pa kun gyi gsangs / bla 
named pa’i byang chub sems)’.2 In addition, the ultimate bodhicitta is called here the 
‘true way to enlightenment’ (or ‘true method [leading towards] enlightenment’—byang 
chub tshul ‘di brtan pa’o). Also, in Ācārya Kamalaśīla’s Bodhicittabhāvanā, the ultimate 
bodhicitta is introduced as a specific cognitive factor: ‘And what is enlightenment? A 
total cognition of the utter openness that is consciousness’ (see Appendix). 
1 don mchungs pa yis don byed pa /
 rmi lam gnod pa bzhin min nam /
 rmi lam sad pa’i gnas skabs la /
 don byed pa la khyad par med // (Ācārya Gyeltsen Namdol 1991, 18)
2 ‘Not only bodhicitta, but also any term of Mahāyāna that is understood in a gnoseological 
sense can be regarded as a synonym of it [of gnosis—V.K.]. In the non-tantric Mahāyāna, as long 
as terms such as bodhi, buddha, prajñāpāramitā, and madhyama pratipat imply a veritable non-
conceptual gnosis that cognises true reality (i.e. śūnyatā, tathatā, etc.), they can be equated with 
gnoseological bodhicitta’ (Wangchuk 2007, 199).
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Thus this paper explores the understanding of bodhicitta as a kind of cognitive 
strategy and/or a specific instrument of cognition in Tantric Buddhism that is situated 
and functions beyond the reach of vijñāna. All the attempts to describe ultimate 
bodhicitta within consciousness and with the help of consciousness are by definition 
unrealisable, but I assume that it is possible to grope around in the darkness of 
consciousness (vijñāna) using the stratum of definitions and assertions on ultimate 
bodhicitta given in the Guhyasamājatantra before we find a sign of light. 
The plot of the second chapter
In the second chapter of the Guhyasamājatantra, five Tathagāgatas (Vairocana, 
Akṣobhya, Ratnaketu, Amitāyus, Amoghasiddhi)3 who previously emerged from 
the heart of the principal deity called Bhagavān Sarvatathāgatakāyavākcittavajrādhi - 
pati (‘the Blessed One, the Vajra Body, Speech and Mind of all Tathagāgatas’)4 ask 
this principle deity (Vajradhara) to proclaim ‘the secret of all Tathagāgatas, highest 
Bodhicitta’. Then Vajradhara asks the Tathagāgatas to unify their bodies, speeches, 
and minds, himself enters the samādhi called ‘vajra of the perfect and complete 
method of enlightenment of all Tathagāgatas’,5 and explains bodhicitta like this:6
dngos po med pas sgom pa med /
bsgom par bya ba sgom pa min /
de ltar dnos po dngos med pas /
sgom pa dmigs su med pa’o //
[When] particular existents do not exist, attention7 [also] does not exist,
[and] the very act of attention is not attention;
thus, if a particular existent does not exist,
the attention is not referential [to anything].
3 It is necessary to note that the very plot of the Tantra takes place in the vagina (bhaga) of the 
Vajra Consort of the Essence of the Body, Speech and Mind of all Tathāgatas (De bzhin gshegs pa 
thams cad kyi sku dang gsung dang thugs kyi snying po rdo rje btsun ma). We obviously can identify 
this place with Yum or Prajñāpāramitā as a mother of all Buddhas.
4 Guiseppe Tucci noticed ‘that the Guhyasamāja admits of six and not of five supreme Bud-
dhas; this means that there is some connection between this Tantra and the Kālacakra which, as 
known, postulates the existence of a first Buddha, the Ādi Buddha of which the fivefold series is the 
emanation’ (Tucci 1934–35, 341). The principal deity in the text of the Guhyasamājatantra has dif-
ferent names—Mahāvairocana, Vajradhara, Mahāvajradhara, Bodhicittavajra, or sometimes simply 
Bhagavān. It is possible to assume that the diversity of names of the principal deity points to the idea 
of the ontological indeterminacy of the state of the principal deity. The first emanation of the principal 
deity is Akṣobhya, and he is placed in the center of the maṇḍala. According to Candrakīrti, ‘Vajrad-
hara or Mahāvajradhara, as he regularly calls this supreme Buddha, is the body and the five Buddhas 
his five constituents or skandhas; the symbol of this body is the mandala in its entirety’ (ibid., 342). 
5 de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa’i tshul rdo rje.
6 See Tibetan and Sanskrit text in Fremantle 1971, 191–4.
7 The term sgom pa may be translated here as ‘attention’ or ‘creative attention’. 
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Then other Tathagāgatas by turn enter different samādhis8 and supplement the 
explanation of Bodhicittavajra with their interpretations of bodhicitta:
Vairocana:
dngos po thams cad dang bral ba /
phung po khams dang skye mched dang /
gzun dang ‘dzin pa rnam spangs pa /
chos bdag med pa mnyams nyid pas /
rang sems gdod nas ma skyes pa /
stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin no //
So far as dharmas are without any individuality of their own and are undifferentiated,
the individual mind—[which] is devoid of phenomenal substantial entity, 
and is not related to skandhas, dhātu, or āyatana, 
[and is not related to] the apprehended object or the apprehending subject—
is primordially not arising; the emptiness is its self-identity.
Akṣobhya:
dngos po ‘di rnams ma skyes pa /
chos dang chos nyid med pa ste /
nam mkha’ lta bur bdag med pa /
byang chub tshul ‘di brtan pa’o //
These particular existents do not arise;
neither dharmas nor reality itself exist;
the lack of individuality is like an open space;
this is the true way to enlightenment. 
Ratnaketu:
chos rnam thams cad dngos med cing /
chos kyi mtshan nyid rnam par spangs /
bdag med chos las kun tu byung /
byang chub tshul ‘di brtan pa’o //
All dharmas are devoid of particular existent;
they have no individual characteristics of their own;
everything appears from the absence of the individuality of dharmas; 
this is the true way to enlightenment.
8 The samādhi of each Tathagāgata has a different name. Vairocana’s samādhi is called ‘vajra 
of the clear understanding of all Tathagāgatas’ (de bzhin shegs pa thams cad kyi mngon par rtogs pa 
rdo rje), Akṣobhya’s, ‘vajra of the inexhaustibility of all Tathagāgatas’ (de bzhin shegs pa thams cad 
kyi mi zad pa’i rdo rje), Ratnaketu’s, ‘vajra of the selflessness of all Tathagāgatas’ (de bzhin shegs 
pa thams cad kyi bdag med pa rdo rje), Amitayus’, ‘vajra light of the shining radiance’ (‘od zer ‘bar 
ba rdo rje sgron ma), and Amoghasiddhi’s, ‘vajra of the insurmountability of all Tathagāgatas’ (de 
bzhin shegs pa thams cad kyi zil gyis gnon po rdo rje). Each samādhi is called vajra to emphasize 
the indestructible nature of this state and corresponds to a definite quality of a Tathagāgata (clear 
understanding, inexhaustibility, etc.). 
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Amitayus:
ma skyes pa yi chos rnams la /
ngo bo med de sgom pa’ang med /
nam mka’i tshul du sbyor ba yis /
dngos po dag du rab tu bsgrags //
Since all dharmas do not arise,
neither entities nor attention exist.
If [you] associate [yourself] with an open space,
the perfect being will manifest [himself].
Amoghasiddhi:
chos rnams rang bzhin ‘od gsal ba /
gdod nas dag pa nam mkha’ bzhin /
byang chub med cing mngon rtogs med /
byang chub tshul ‘di brtan pa’o //
Luminous is the nature of all dharmas,
primordially perfect, like an open space. 
Neither enlightenment nor clear realisation exists;
this is the true way to enlightenment.9
Unfortunately, the Tibetan translation lost the link between bhāva and bhāvana 
in the Sanskrit original (in Tibetan, dngos po means ‘substantial entity’ and sgom 
pa means ‘concentrated attention’, ‘cultivating’, etc.). The word bhāvana (sgom pa) 
commonly is translated as ‘developing’, ‘producing’, ‘meditating and also ‘imagining’, 
‘supposing’, etc. If we link together all the meanings of Sanskrit bhāvana and add the 
numerous meanings of Tibetan sgom pa, we get ‘creative attention’. In this paper I 
omit the adjective ‘creative’, since in Mahayana Buddhism each act of attention is 
at the same time the act of representing certain states of the five consciousnesses. It 
is attention—a state of current awareness—that gives vent to sense and intelligible 
perception. It is the act of attention that creates the very form of perception that 
is not free of conceptual contaminations in such a way that finally we perceive 
representations of consciousness (vijñaptimātram). Thereby, each act of attention is 
always the act of creative attention that forms discernible phenomena (vijñeya) for the 
discerning consciousness (vijñāna).10
If one takes into consideration the etymological correspondence of bhāva and 
bhāvana, then it is possible to define bhāva (dngos po) as ‘the producer of the act of 
9 In their verses Akṣobhya, Ratnaketu and Amoghasiddhi use the same formula—byang chub 
tshul ‘di brtan pa’o—‘this is the true way to enlightenment’, which may be also translated ‘this is 
the method (tshul) [to reach] enlightenment’. This may be understood as a characteristic of a special 
cognitive act where bodhicitta is presented as a core element. 
10 On controversies in the philosophy of perception in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism, see Dreifus 1997. 
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attention’, and from this follows that all of the phenomenal world exists only in the 
act of attention, i.e. in the mind only. 
Bu ston rin chen grub ‘explicitly advocates’ the point of view that this verse 
belongs to the Yogācāra (sems tsam) school (see Bentor 2010, 94).11 On the 
other hand, Tsongkhapa and his disciple Mkhas grub rje follow the position of 
Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika: this is highly predictable if we take into consideration 
the Tibetan translation of the verse where dngos po is not semantically tied to sgom 
pa. The ostensive definition of dngos po in the Tibetan translation of Kamalaśīla’s 
Bodhicittabhāvanā (bdag, sems can, srog, gso ba, skye bu, gang zag, shed las skyes, 
shed bu, byed pa po) also does not allow us to connect dngos po with sgom pa.
In the Piṇḍīkṛtasādhana, ascribed to Nāgārjuna, the first verse corresponds to 
the stage of dissolution and emptiness, which is only a small part of the sādhana. 
On the other hand, however, the verses of the six Tathāgatas may be understood 
as a successive description of the entire sādhana, i.e. of all the stages towards final 
realisation. The first verse proclaimed by Vajradhara describes bodhicitta as the initial 
state that can be brought into correlation with the generation stage (bskyed rim) of 
the five-stage practice of Guhyasamāja. Āryadeva in the Caryāmelāpakapradīpa calls 
this stage ‘mind isolation’ (citta-viveka) or ‘mental purification’ (citta-viśuddhi). The 
last verse, proclaimed by Amoghasiddhi, describes bodhicitta as the total union, the 
‘integration stage’ (yuganaddha krama) in Āryadeva’s terminology, where there is no 
difference between enlightened and unenlightened states. Thus realisation of ultimate 
bodhicitta in the beginning is tied to the total withdrawal of selective attention from 
perceptive, linguistic and mental phenomena. Here the grosser levels of consciousness 
dissolve and more subtle consciousness manifests itself.12 Correspondingly, it is 
possible to understand Amitayus’ verses in correlation with the arising of the illusory 
body (sgyulus), which is the third stage of the five-stage Guhyasamāja completion 
stage (rdzogs rim rim lnga). Thereby, the verses of the six Tathāgatas in the second 
chapter of the Guhyasamājatantra describe a specific cognitive act, the means, the 
very process, and the goal, which all are bodhicitta.
11 It is interesting that ‘Butön was one of the last commentators on the Guhyasamājatantra who 
actually knew Sanskrit, and who could see that the meaning of our verse [i.e. the verse proclaimed 
by Vajradhara—V.K.] in its Tibetan rendering was different from the meaning of the Sanskrit. He 
could also see that, in its most important commentary, the Pradīpoddyotana in its Tibetan translation, 
the meaning of our verse was further altered, at least since the 14th century, if not before. But Butön 
does not comment on this’ (Bentor 2010, 94). 
12 According to the Guhyasamāja system, the gross consciousnesses are the five sense con-
sciousnesses and mental consciousness; the subtle consciousnesses are the three levels of conscious-
ness called the minds of vivid white, red, and black appearance; the point of destination is the very 
subtle level of consciousness—the mind of clear light.
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Intentionality: possession and attention
A consciousness, being ‘always a consciousness of’, to put it in Husserl’s words 
(quoted from Smith 2006, 56), implies a presence of external continuing things (that 
are relatively invariable) and continuing things (which are also relatively invariable) 
that are presumed to be the possessors of mind (or attention), i.e. they are presumed 
to be living beings, conscious beings, human beings, or mind holders (sems can). The 
concept of mind holders is introduced in the Guhyasamājatantra by the term bhāva 
(dngos po)—‘particular existent’, or ‘substantial entity’.13 The existence of external 
things, of consciousness, and of mind holders implies a continuing. Any thing 
continues per se if it holds recollection about its state previous to the present given 
state. This is a trait of consciousness, or, to be more precise, a trait of manovijñāna 
(yid kyi rnam par shes pa)—which according to Abhidharmakośa (I.17; in Pruden 
1990) is an awareness of the ‘just-deceased consciousness that is the immediately 
antecedent condition for the present consciousness’. Thereby, the present moment has 
to contain information about the just-past moment. ‘To be’ means ‘to be continuous 
per se’, and ‘to be continuous per se’ means ‘to possess a consciousness’ or ‘to be the 
producer of attention’. But is a stone, for example, aware of its own just-past state? 
If it does not continue per se, it does not exist; if it continues per se, it possesses a 
mind. As mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang states in Stong Thun Chen Mo: ‘Although 
the Svatantrika Madhyamakas accept that things exist from the object’s own side, they 
do not accept that this is [what it means for something] to truly exist. The Prasangikas 
[on the other hand] accept that if something exists in this way, [that is from its own 
side,] then it must truly exist’ (Cabezon 1992, 174). So true existence is existence 
from the thing’s own side, irrespective of the name this thing has and irrespective 
of how this thing is perceived by valid cognition. As we can see, the continuity of 
external things is a problem of consciousness, but whose consciousness is it and to 
what extent is this statement of a question admissible?
The act of attention: 
the observer and the thing to be observed
The presence of attention turns the external world into a complex of intentional 
variable elements inasmuch as the external things always refer to particular meanings, 
13 The ostensive definition of dngos po is given by Ācarya Kamalaśīla in Bodhicittabhāvanā (see 
Appendix). From this definition it follows that dngos po describes the quality of a physical entity to 
be existent. The translation of dngos po as ‘particular existent’ was introduced by Herbert V. Guen-
ther. He wrote: ‘I deliberately avoid the term “substance” in this connection because this term is 
exceedingly ambiguous even in Western philosophies and its unqualified (or unqualifiable) use with 
reference to Eastern ways of thinking would only add to confusion’ (Guenther 1966, 297).
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involve particular meanings, or impart specific states, deploying the attention in such 
a way that the external world itself falls apart into intentionally significant elements. 
Both observer and things to be observed have to be continuing entities; thereby 
continuity is a necessary condition of acts of attention. On the one hand, we can see 
that continuity from a thing’s own side is a level where thinking (i.e. consciousness) 
begins. On the other hand, the beginning of consciousness is tied to the delusion that 
external things are continuous from their own side and are intrinsically observer-
independent. Strictly speaking, this delusion has no beginning since it is the condition 
that assigns a vantage (access) point from which the whole world of observed things 
derives. The absence of this vantage point makes it impossible to be in the world 
with its familiar semantic content and, respectively, makes it impossible to make 
any assertion about the beginning of the delusion. Thereby, existence in the world of 
intrinsically observer-independent entities begins with a delusion (avidyā) and this 
delusion may be removed only within saṃsāra. 
Bodhicitta as a strategy of cognition
With the end of delusion (avidyā), vijñāna also stops: ‘Since vijñāna is one of the terms 
of the classical pratītyasamutpāda series and arises dependent on ignorance (avidyā), 
it stands to reason that when avidyā is uprooted vijñāna will come to an end. However, 
and this is a very important point, it should not be assumed that such an event signals 
the total extinction of mental processes’ (Harris 1991, 50). After cessation of vijñāna, 
another mental activity comes to the scene. As is stated in the śloka proclaimed by 
Amitayus: ‘If [you] associate [yourself] with an open space, / the perfect being would 
manifest [itself]’.14 Harris writes: ‘while vijñāna refers to a conditioned surface 
state of consciousness only available to the unenlightened, prajñā/jñāna refers to 
the unconditioned vision of reality (ibid., 55). We can see that several terms are 
used to describe enlightened cognition. Harris notes that ‘jñāna may designate the 
end process in the development of prajñā’ (ibid.). In the Guhyasamājatantra the 
term bodhicitta is used to designate an enlightened state of cognition. I have already 
noted that acts of cognition—not belief or emotional events—play a major role in 
Buddhist soteriology. The terms prajñā and jñāna (wisdom and gnosis, respectively) 
refer to the semantic field of epistemology, whereas the concept of bodhicitta unifies 
epistemology and ontology in a single stratum. There is no differentiation between 
knower and known in this stratum. In addition, bodhicitta, together with its cognitive 
components, contains an element of natural responsiveness (thugs rje) and refers to 
a state where knower (observer) and known (phenomenon) are unified in a seamless 
single psychic event. This natural responsiveness (thugs rje) epistemologically opens 
14 Or ‘particular existent will manifest itself in purity’ (dag du).
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a phenomenon (an external thing) for the observer, a state of affinity appears between 
the external thing and the observer, the phenomenon becomes a part of the observer 
(the observer becomes a part of the phenomenon), and great compassion (= total 
complicity = omniscience, snying rje chen po) arises naturally.
This act of unifying the apprehended object and apprehending subject (gzung / 
‘dzin) becomes possible on the condition that all ‘dharmas are without individuality 
of their own (bdag med) and undifferentiated (mnyam nyid pa)’.
I would like to emphasise that the strategy of cognition described above essentially 
differs from what we commonly call ‘cognition’, but it is obviously cognition in the 
sense that the practitioner himself perceives the innate essence of all things, and 
thereby there is no need to ‘believe impossible things’. Bodhicitta as a strategy of 
cognition implies a process of transformation of the mind itself; it is not a search for 
a convenient corner from which to observe objects. This process of transformation, 
in turn, implies the successive converging of ‘the Same’ and ‘the Other’ to a final 
integration. Let us see then how this transformation is possible.
Discreteness and composition
Famous verses on bodhicitta proclaimed by Tathagāgata Vairocana are the subject 
of many Indian and Tibetan commentaries. Among them is the Bodhicittavivaraṇa 
attributed to Nāgārjuna and the Bodhicittabhāvanā written by Ācārya Kamalaśīla (a 
translation of this text is presented in the appendix).15 
In Vairocana verses, dharmas are introduced as being without self-sufficiency and 
as being undifferentiated.16 Dharmas are isomorphous, but even the multiplicity and 
spatial characteristics of dharmas are open to question. 
Two types of successive reduction are peculiar to Buddhist philosophy. Ontic 
representation of reality in general (as existence or as being in abstracto) is reduced 
15 If one compares these two texts, Kamalaśīla’s text corresponds much more closely to the genre 
of commentary than Nāgārjuna’s Byang chub sems ‘grel. The latter is more of a writing on a given 
thesis. Tibetan scholar Ngag dbang grags pa (16th century), on the basis of Indian commentary written 
by Smṛtijñānakīrti, created an eight-point outline for the proper understanding of Vairocana’s lines: 
‘1) Extensive definition of ultimate bodhicitta;
2)  Meaning of the expression “devoid of particular existents”;
3)  Meaning of “not related to skandhas”, etc;
4)  Meaning of self-sufficientless and undifferentiated [state of dharmas]; 
5)  Meaning of not arising of individual consciousness, etc; 
6)  Extensive definition of conventional bodhicitta;
7)  Explanation of the meaning of so called “cutting of the four uncuttable”;
8)  Explanation of benefits of [generation] of twofold bodhicitta’ (Ācārya Gyeltsen Namdol 
1991, 61–2)’. 
16 The latter characteristic is similar to Parmenides’ ontic assertion about the non-existence of 
the diversity of things. Cf. ‘It is also indivisible. This is because it is completely homogeneous, its 
continuity not disrupted by varying degrees of being’ (8.22–5 in Diels, Kranz 1952). 
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to the present spacing of diverse things. Later this disposition of present things is 
reduced to a homogeneous, quantum field of dharmas—dharmadhātu (chos dbyings). 
Any elementary event is a combination of at least three quanta: one of six internal 
powers (adhyātma-āyatana), corresponding to one of six external bases (bhāya-
āyatana) and one of six consciousnesses (vijñāna). These quanta really become 
dharmas (carriers of quality) only after being involved in a composition. In other 
words, elements that are neutral and devoid of any characteristics become something 
(eye consciousness, for example) when they keep a definite ‘place’ or ‘stand’, i.e. 
they are topologically conditioned. I want to say that a quantum (dharma) possesses 
a definite quality, becomes differentiating consciousness, and becomes an external 
product of perception or sense abilities only within a temporal (strictly speaking, 
a momentary) composition. The composition itself is only a conventionality; 
the very existence of any composition may be established only from within the 
composition, because an agent (kartṛ) and enjoyer (bhoktṛ) appears only within the 
composition, mistakingly establishing himself as an external observer although he 
is always a participant. Accurately speaking, an observer as a person or ‘I’ (gang 
zag, bdag) corresponds to the imaginary nature of reality (kun brtags, parikalpita), 
the interdependence of dharmas in composition corresponds to the dependent nature 
of reality (gzhan dbang, paratantra), and the grained field of uncombined dharmas-
quanta corresponds to the essential nature of reality (yongs grub, pariniṣpanna).17 
What is at issue is not three different realities, but three strata of a single fundamental 
reality as it is described in the third chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga. We can see 
that the appearance of subject-object duality is not a construction of citta (sems). An 
element that is playing a role of citta in the structure of temporal dharmic composition 
undoubtedly is of great importance, but it is only a role (or a topological function); 
besides, this ‘role’ would hardly be possible without the other elements of the 
composition on their own. Citta or mentality being active (sems pa, cetanā) provides 
awareness and discrimination (rnam par shes pa, vijñāna) and continuity (yid, manas). 
Discrimination and continuity together with other elements in composition generate 
an event with a conditional ‘centre’ mistakingly taken for ‘I’. Bodhicitta, being a 
strategy of cognition, in turn, emphasises a fundamental role of joint participation, 
17 In this connection it looks unreasonable to accuse Yogācāra of being an idealistic philosophy. 
Like Mādhyamaka, Yogācāra reveals the true nature of reality. Following a doctrine of dependent 
arising, Yogācāra philosophers simply could not emphasise only one topological constituent of a 
compound event; they just emphasised the multilayer nature of reality and expansive role (prapañca, 
spros pa) of discriminative thought (vikalpa, rtog pa). ‘The statement that the tripe world is mind-
only (cittamātra) simply means that for the unenlightened person what he or she takes to be reality is 
in fact nothing but mind and its concomitants (cittacaitta). The enlightened being on the other hand 
sees things as they are (yathābhūtam)’ (Harris 1991, 82). 
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removing ‘topological’ deformation of the quantum field of dharmas caused by ‘I’. 
In this world filled with intentional phenomena, consciousness is always trying to 
make its way towards something that is not itself. It follows from understanding that 
each act of perception is not an act of passively accessing data, but rather is a masked 
question aimed at something that maybe belongs to a reality other than the reality of 
consciousness itself. This question is based on a distrust of the reality of the world of 
phenomena. Eliminating this distrust is proved by cultivating total acceptance of the 
Other in all its manifestations. The series of these acceptances are called pāramitās: 
the acceptance in the form of giving of oneself (dāna pāramitā), the acceptance in 
the form of discipline and proper conduct (śīla pāramitā), the acceptance in the form 
of patience (kṣānti pāramitā), the acceptance in the form of effort and vigor (vīrya 
pāramitā), the acceptance in the form of meditation (dhyāna pāramitā), and finally 
prajñā pāramitā—an established acceptance in the form of identity. Thus bodhicitta is 
the subsurface work of the consciousness pointed at eliminating the distrust of reality 
of the locus of the Other. The five worldly pāramitās are strategies for approaching 
the Other, and the sixth pāramitā is the complete consentaneity of the subject of 
apprehension and the object of apprehension.
It is necessary to note that each of the activities presented by pāramitās has its own 
recipient, or receiver (i.e. multiple forms of the Other). The question is to whom or 
to where the activity of the sixth pāramitā is addressed. This tricky pāramitā has no 
receiver or recipient. The absence of recipient has a justifiable reason: it simply does 
not exist. Final direct perceiving of this fact shatters consciousness; individuality 
disappears and becomes all phenomena at the same time.
Intimacy and cognition
As we know, compassion (karuṇā), an altruistic attitude, forms the root of bodhicitta, 
and bodhicitta becomes a guiding principle for bodhisattvas in Mahāyāna Buddhism. 
But why in a system substantially rooted in epistemology did compassion become so 
important? Is it simply connected to the traditionally built framework of ethical-moral 
discipline (śīla) or is there another explanation? The very act of knowing and acts of 
behaviour presuppose the availability of the Other (other entities, other phenomena, 
other minds). What is ‘the Other’18 from the point of view of the union of knower and 
known? Nagarjuna stated in Catuḥstava: ‘When (someone) cognizes (something) as born 
18 Different considerations on ‘Same’ and ‘the Other’ may be found in works of Jacques Lacan, 
Emmanuel Lévinas, Slavoj Žižek, and other modern thinkers. Lacan, for instance, poses a Tantric 
question: ‘A geometry implies the heterogeneity of locus, namely that there is a locus of the Other. 
Regarding this locus of the Other, of one sex as Other, as absolute Other, what does the most recent 
development in topology allow us to posit?’
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or unborn, present or gone, bound or liberated (then) he maintains duality (dvaya) (and 
consequently) does not know the truth (tattva)’ (Lindtner 1986, 148–49). Commenting 
on Vairocana’s verses, Kamalaśīla writes this: ‘since skandhas, dhātu and āyatana are 
devoid of their self-identity, then mind is totally free from being an apprehended object 
or being an apprehending subject. If mind does not exist like an object of apprehension, 
then it also does not exist like a subject of apprehension’ (see Appendix). 
In the act of cognition, this ultimate reality appears as conventional reality, which 
presumes the existence of the Other. It is important to note that the ultimate reality is 
not derivable from the conventional, for the circle of saṃsāra is endless and closed. 
There is no transition or passage from conventional to ultimate reality. This is why 
the way of Tantra, if compared with the Pāramitāyana, is conceded to be easier: it 
is for the nonobscured, and it has many skilful methods, etc.19 The Pāramitāyana is 
a strategy of approaching ultimate reality, but this approaching may be dragged out 
to infinity, because the movement from saṃsāra to ultimate reality is crowded by a 
multitude of phenomena and events that require permanent and careful analytical 
examination. Thereby, it is very difficult to reach ultimate reality in any other 
way than to reproduce or copy an ultimate reality that is a unity of emptiness and 
compassion within conventional existence. But how exactly may ultimate reality be 
reproduced within saṃsāra? I assert that there is only one way to reproduce it: to 
imitate it (mimesis) within conventional reality. 
As I see it, the imitation may be established 1) by content and 2) by form. 
The ultimate union by content corresponds to the five worldly pāramitās, where 
conventional boddhicita (saṃvṛtibodhicitta, kun rdzob kyi byang chub kyi sems), which 
is compassion for the Other and the intention to liberate others from suffering, is a 
model of ultimate bodhicitta (pāramārthikabodhicitta, don dam pa’i byang chub kyi 
sems), which is nonduality (śūnyatā) and gnosis (ye shes). The five worldly pāramitās 
are five different forms of acceptance of the Other, that is, they compose the very 
essence of compassion. 
The ultimate union by form corresponds to the deity yoga (lha’i mgnong rtogs, 
literally, ‘realization of deity’). The very act of imitation has no moral colouring, 
just as a mirror reflects without any moral content. Only the precise reproduction 
of a given model by the individual totality—body, speech and mind—is of great 
importance here.
Thereby, indivisible union, being out of reach of cognition, is a prototype for the 
combination of ethics and ritual in Tantric Buddhism. In this case, bodhicitta as a 
strategy of cognition may be understood to be a mimesis or imitation (passion for 
19 About the superiority of mantra over sūtra, see the chapter ‘The Difference Between Sūtra and 
Mantra’ in Hopkins 2008.
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imitation) of ultimate union in saṃsāra by different means. Bodhicitta is here something 
that is impossible to understand or reach epistemologically but is possible to re-present. 
Sophisticated techniques and the rules of this re-presentation or mimesis of bodhicitta 
within different levels of human existence (spiritual and ritual) are described in detail 
in different sādhanās. In the root tantra and its vyākhyās and in the bodhicitta verses 
of the second chapter, particularly, these rules of re-presentation are described in 
general terms.20 Different commentaries by the Ārya and Jñānapāda traditions of the 
Guhyasamāja cycle as well as the Bodhicittabhāvanā by Ācārya Kamalaśīla explain 
in detail the most difficult points of this mimetic strategy of cognition. Kamalaśīla’s 
analysis of the path of realisation of ultimate bodhicitta based on Vairocana’s verse does 
not provide us with any new knowledge; it describes a succession of matrix elements 
that are patterns for organising one’s consciousness. The very title of Kamalaśīla’s work 
translated in the appendix—Bodhicittabhāvanā—may be interpreted as a method for 
reorganising the structure of attention to gain bodhicitta. 
Thereby, the bodhicitta in Mantrayāna is a strategy of cognition, but this type of 
cognition is based on the will to imitate ultimate reality. It may be called a strategy 
of mimesis, where all acts of perceiving result in a new being rather than in new 
knowledge.
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Appendix
Ācārya Kamalaśīla
Bodhicittabhāvanā (byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa)
Homage to the Buddha!
Here I will present an exhaustive explanation of bodhicitta. 
Bhagavan said: ‘All dharmas are established by the mind’. So [Bhagavan] himself said, that 
is why the detailed analysis of the mind must be done. 
So far as dharmas are without any individuality of their own21 and are undifferentiated,22
the individual mind—[which] is devoid of phenomenal substantial entity,23
and is not related to skandhas, dhātu, or āyatana,
[and is not related to]the apprehended object or the apprehending subject—
is primordially not arising; the emptiness is its self-identity.
What is the meaning of these words? The term ‘phenomenal substantial entity’ in the 
formulation ‘devoid of phenomenal substantial entity’ is described [in terms] of self-existent 
individuality.24 Correspondingly, the exposition [of the term] is as follows: individuality of its 
own, possessor of the mind, leaving being, mothered one, individual, person, individual human 
being, son of Manu, functioning one, experiencing one. [None of] these are [endowed with] 
the nature of mind. And why? Because none of these possess characteristics of self-sufficient, 
independently acting agents. 
21 bdag med.
22 mnyam nyid pa.
23 dngos po = phenomenal substantial existence = being.
24 bdag.
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Thereby, as far as in this case there is no self-identical25 [substantial] existence; how can we 
say that it is [endowed with] the nature of mind? Because of the reason in the phrase ‘devoid 
of phenomenal substantial entity and not related to skandhas, dhātu, or āyatana’ there appears 
[a notion of] the absence of the nature of the mind. In this way [the phrase] ‘not related to 
skandhas, dhātu, or āyatana, [and not related to] the apprehended object or the apprehending 
subject…’ [exposes that] skandhas, etc. per se do not represent themselves in the ultimate 
sense; then how can we say that they are [endowed with] the nature of mind? 
Skandhas are not self-identical, and that being the case, then each [skandha], from [the 
skandha] of form, etc. to all skandhas [together], are devoid of self-identity. 
The skandha of form [consists of] the self-identity of substantiality-producing forces 
(elements) and of the self-identity of derived substantive functions. Substantiality-producing 
elements are fields26 of earth, water, fire and wind. Derived substantive functions are visual 
forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangible forms. Both earth and the other substantiality-
producing forces (elements), as well as the derived substantive functions all together and one 
by one, are devoid27 of phenomenal substantial existence.28
They are, so to speak, ‘birds of a feather’,29 and in the same manner the [skandha of] form, 
since Bhagavan said, ‘Monks, the skandha of form is an emptiness [tainted] by the skandha of 
form’, just as in the absence of a tree there is no shade. That being so, [the skandha of] form 
does not truly exist. 
In the same way the skandha of sensation does not truly exist. Sensation has three forms: 
[feelings of] pleasure, [feelings of] suffering, and [neutral feelings] of neither pleasure nor 
suffering. Because of interdependency, a pleasurable [feeling] receives a meaning that is 
subject to the [feeling of] suffering. None [of the forms of the skandha of sensation] can be 
brought into an object; just like the son of a barren woman, it is devoid of substantiality.30 What 
is long and what is short is apprehended in usage. In addition, skandha of sensation has two 
components—body and consciousness. Since a body is composed of the elements of skandha 
of form, it cannot be brought into an object. For this reason, if the body is absent, the sensations 
related to it also do not exist. Since Bhagavan said, ‘Consciousness after all is without location; 
it is inexpressible, with no abiding realm, unapproachable for investigation, indiscernible, with 
no appearance, totally not cognisable’, then what kind of sensation [is there to speak about]? 
In this case, if consciousness is absent, then the sensations arising from consciousness do not 
exist. Since it is said, ‘Monks, the skandha of sensation is emptiness [tainted] by the skandha 
of sensation’, then the skandha of sensation also does not truly exist. 
So long as ‘skandha of discernment’ is just a name, it doesn’t exist. Skandha of discernment 
performs a marking of self-identical existence,31 but if no independent phenomenon exists,32 
25 bdag.
26 khams.
27 mi dmigs, or maybe ‘does not come in sight, or cannot be brought into an object’.
28 Or they are not beings.
29 Gang na gchig yod pa de na cig shos kyang.
30 rdzas su med pa.
31 bdag.
32 dngos po = here objects of consciousness.
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then with respect to what may signification be done? Therefore, it is said: ‘If the designatum33 
does not exist, then the signifier34 does not exist either. Monks, the skandha of discernment 
is emptiness [tainted] by the skandha of discernment’; then the skandha of sensation does not 
truly exist either.
In the same way, the skandha of formative patterns is devoid of essence.35 And why 
does [it] not have essence? Because it is simply a composite.36 The skandha of formative 
patterns is asserted to be the so called ‘mental [factors] derived from consciousness’:37 
sensation, discernment, intention,38 resolution, contact, discriminating intellect, 
recollection, attention and conviction, none of [which] are endowed with an arising.39 
The mental factors derived from consciousness all together and one by one are devoid 
of the characteristics of an arising [phenomenon], and they do not exist by virtue of the 
characteristics of the action of the formative patterns skandha. Hence, it is said: ‘If there 
is no agent, then action also does not exist. Monks, the skandha of formative patterns is 
emptiness [tainted] by the skandha of formative patterns’. Hence the skandha of formative 
patterns does not truly exist either.
Visual [consciousness], auditory [consciousness], olfactory [consciousness], gustatory 
[consciousness], tactile [consciousness], and mental consciousness [compose] the skandha 
of consciousness. Neither visual consciousness nor the other consciousnesses all together 
nor one by one can be brought into an object on their own account. Consciousness may 
arise depending on vision and due to forms if the skandha of form exists and also under the 
assumption that vision and form have already arisen. [As soon as] neither vision nor form 
exists, from whence may consciousness appear? That being so, visual consciousness does not 
arise. One should understand that visual [consciousness], auditory [consciousness], olfactory 
[consciousness], gustatory [consciousness], tactile [consciousness], and mental consciousness 
are of the same range.
[Concerning] mental consciousness: 
Mental consciousness arises depending on a given moment of consciousness40 and with 
respect to dharmas, but [as soon as] the given moment of consciousness passes away, then how 
may consciousness arise without any grounds? Thus, past consciousness has ceased, future 
[consciousness] is unapproachable, and current [consciousness] does not last. For this reason 
the dharmas of the three times do not bring [their] self-identities into an object. This is similar 
to disintegration. Hence, it is said: ‘Monks, the skandha of consciousness is emptiness [tainted] 
by the skandha of consciousness’; hence, the skandha of consciousness does not truly exist. By 
33 rgyu mtshan.
34 rgyu mtshan can.
35 snying po.
36 tshogs pa.
37 sems las byung ba.
38 sems pa.
39 skye ba.
40 yid.
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the same true method, as shown above, skandhas, as well as different dhātu and āyatana, may 
be eliminated. 
By the absence of skandhas, the self-identity of dhātu and āyatana do not exist either. 
Consequently, since skandhas, dhātu, and āyatana are devoid of self-identity, then the mind 
is totally free from being an apprehended object or being an apprehending subject. If the 
mind does not exist as an object of apprehension, then it also does not exist as a subject of 
apprehension. And why does the mind not exist as an object of apprehension? 
It has been said: ‘Bhagavan said: O, Master of Secrets, tathagatas, arhats, and completely 
enlightened buddhas did not perceive, are not perceiving, and will not perceive the mind. O, 
Master of Secrets! This mind is not [something] of a black colour, is not [something] of a yellow 
colour, is not [something] of a red colour, is not [something] of a magenta colour, and is not 
[something] of a crystal-like colour. It is neither long nor short, neither round nor square. It is 
neither apparent nor hidden; it is not a woman, not a man, and not a hermaphrodite. O, Master of 
Secrets! This mind is not the self-nature of the realm of desire, is not the self-nature of the realm 
of forms, and is not the self-nature of the formless realm. It is not the self-identity of devas, 
nāgas, yakśas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kinnaras41 and mahoragas.42 Since all human and 
not human creatures are devoid of self-identity, inasmuch as we look for it everywhere, nothing 
appears to be observable’.43 Hence the mind does not exist as an object of apprehension. 
And why does [the mind] not exist as a subject of apprehension? Since Bhagavan said: ‘O, 
Master of Secrets, if the mind does not arise inside, does not arise outside, and does not arise 
in between, by what [means] may [objects] be apprehended? That is why [the mind] is devoid 
of being a subject or an object. How it is so? O, Master of Secrets, it is because the mind by its 
nature is entirely permeable’.44 And that is why, since we look for it everywhere,45 but nothing 
appears to be observable; how then may apprehension arise?
That is why the mind is free from being a subject or an object.
[The line says] ‘As far as dharmas are without any individuality of their own and are 
undifferentiated’. Like all dharmas, the mind also is devoid of self-identity. Since Bhagavan 
said: ‘All dharmas are empty. The mind possesses the sign of emptiness. All dharmas are 
solitary’. From this it follows that ‘As far as dharmas are without any individuality of their own 
and undifferentiated, individual mind is primordially not arising’. [Since] what primordially 
does not arise is non-arising, then what kind of self-identity [can we speak about]? As it is said, 
‘emptiness is its self-identity’.
41 mi’am ci.
42 lto ‘phye chen po.
43 Citation from the Mahāvairochanābhisaṃbodhi tantra (rnam par snang mdzad chen po mngon 
par rdzogs par byang chub rnam par sprul pa byin gyis rlobs pa shin tu rgyas pa mdo sde’i dbang po’i 
rgyal po) (T 494). 
44 Citation from the Mahāvairochanābhisaṃbodhi tantra (rnam par snang mdzad chen po mngon 
par rdzogs par byang chub rnam par sprul pa byin gyis rlobs pa shin tu rgyas pa mdo sde’i dbang 
po’i rgyal po) (T 494). yongs su dag pa—I translated as ‘entirely opened’, trying to replace a quality 
indicator (pure, purity) with a spatial one. 
45 Literally ‘amidst different types of dharmas’.
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What is ‘emptiness of the [mind’s] self-identity’ like? It is like the sign of an open space. 
Since Bhagavan also said: ‘Emptiness is open space. The mind is equal to space.  The self-
identity [of the mind] is enlightenment’.46 Then, just as an open space is not self-identical 
and arises only nominally,47 the mind is not self-identical either and arises only nominally. 
Therefore we must learn that the mind is devoid of arising and cessation. This is what is called 
the highest entirely permeable and perfect enlightenment.
In this way Bhagavan said: ‘And what is enlightenment? Complete cognition of the totally48 
opened mind, as it is, is the highest entirely permeable and perfect enlightenment. In this 
regard, o Master of Secrets, since all dharmas do not exist and cannot be brought into the 
object,49 it is called ‘the highest entirely permeable and perfect enlightenment’. And why is 
that so? [Because] the sign of open space is enlightenment, [since] nowhere [in open space] is 
there any discrimination or any other objects to be discriminated against. And why is this so? 
Because enlightenment is a sign of open space.
Later on this utter openness of the individual mind becomes distorted by semblance50 
and in the minds of sentient beings there appear epistemological constructs. Oh, [poor are] 
these sentient beings who do not understand their self-identity, whose unopened discursive 
consciousness falls under the influence of negative forces,51 who experience all the manifold 
types of suffering in saṃsāra: suffering is [their destiny]. These sentient beings ought to think: 
‘It follows that I have to strive to understand and look for the real nature of the ultimate 
mind’. This perfect individual mind arises in all sentient beings wholly dependent on great 
compassion. In this way bodhicitta should be explained:
‘When cognition [becomes] similar to open space,
the element of bodhicitta arises.
Simultaneously there appears a mind 
devoted solely to the benefit of others’.
This kind of contemplation is the contemplation of bodhicitta. Bhagavan also said:
‘If the merits [resulting from generation of] bodhicitta
would appear in visible forms,
they would totally fill 
all celestial space’.
Thus this practice of the highest enlightenment is essential; it is a source of magical formulas 
(dhāraṇī), of correct analytical cognition, and of the signs, marks, and all [other] qualities of 
the Buddha. Bhagavan said: ‘Monks, if this [teaching about] the qualities of bodhicitta, which 
I glorify, are put into action and are transmitted, it will not disappear ever to the end of the 
46 byang chub.
47 ming tsam du.
48 yang dag ba.
49 mi dmigs.
50 mthong ba’i rjes su thabs kyis.
51 gdon gyis zin pa.
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kalpa’. Thus, this generation of bodhicitta becomes the basis for the practice of bodhisattvas 
seeking to attain omniscience. And this requires immersion in yogic practice. 
[Colophon]
Here Bodhicittabhāvanā written by Ācārya Kamalaśīla comes to an end. 
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